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abstract 
The paper discusses the future of Delhi’s electronic bazaars in the wake of the ‘Make in 
India’ (MiI) program. MiI aims to develop a home-grown manufacturing base that, among 
its many goals, also targets the same popular market sector that the bazaars currently 
operate in. However, there is virtually no consideration of the role of bazaars and the 
informal economy within the MiI program. Rather, this initiative, along with similar efforts 
to render the economy formal and transparent, sees the bazaars with their reliance on cash 
transactions and their scant respect for intellectual property rights as part of a regressive 
grey economy. This paper initiates a discussion on what could be the consequences of 
following the present route of disregarding the informal economy that, in fact, has hosted 
the most industrious model of production in the country. 
Introduction 
There has been much enthusiasm associated with the ‘Make in India’ (MiI) 
program that was launched in September 2014 (Kala, 2015; Khedekar, 2014). The 
program targets 25 core sectors to make India a manufacturing powerhouse. In a 
country that did not develop a robust manufacturing base post-independence, 
(Roy, 2012; Sanders, 1977), the MiI wants to make a significant contribution in 
that direction. Growth in manufacturing is expected to garner revenue and create 
employment opportunities for a large section of the population. The program was 
seen as particularly timely in relation to the slowdown of the Chinese economy. 
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Resource-rich India with low labour costs could compete with the Chinese 
hegemony in world manufacturing (Zhong and Kala, 2015)1. 
I want to issue a caveat early on, namely that this paper does not discuss MiI in its 
totality, nor does it go into an in-depth discussion on the various schemes 
undertaken so far. Instead, the paper focuses more on the discourses surrounding 
MiI in relation to the electronics industry. The paper is a speculation on the future 
of local cultures of tinkering, as large-scale programs make headway into the 
informal economy that has characterised much of the Indian market for low-cost 
consumer electronics.  
As far as the electronics industry is concerned, the MiI program wants to go 
beyond the $65 billion domestic market for electronics and make India a 
competitive actor in the $2 trillion global market. The turnover of the Indian 
electronics industry (including consumer electronics, electronic components, 
industrial electronics, computer hardware, communication, broadcast equipment, 
and strategic electronics) is currently at $6 billion or less than 0.5% of the world 
market. To increase the share of Indian electronics in the global market, the 
government has welcomed investments from foreign companies such as 
Samsung, Eriksson and Foxconn (Seth, 2015; Thevar, 2015). These initiatives are 
primarily geared towards export. In the immediate future, however, the MiI 
intends to support manufacturing and foreign investment that addresses the 
domestic market (D’costa, 2015). The ASSOCHAM and EY report (2016: 12) 
estimates, ‘around 50-60% of the demand for electronic products is fulfilled 
through imports, while nearly 70-80% of the electronic components market is 
import-dependent’. MiI is keen to meet the internal demands for electronics as 
well as make the domestic market attractive to foreign investors.  
As a manufacturing plan, with its eye on the domestic market and local innovation 
cultures, MiI could collaborate with bazaar actors. However, to the extent that 
bazaars are considered in MiI, they are expected to wither away and their 
participants become a reservoir of cheap labour for the formal economy 
(Bhattacharyya and Verma, 2016; Green 2014; Karnik, 2016). Other aspects of the 
bazaars such as their understanding of the local consumers, their practices of 
market-friendly technical fixes, and their industrious nature are ignored. 
The rest of the paper analyses the foreseeable links that MiI could have with the 
informal economy, and how its present agenda of limiting its interaction with 																																																								
1  ASSOCHAM (The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India) and EY 
(Ernst and Young) report (2016) states that as of 2014, the average manufacturing 
labour cost per hour in India was US$0.92 as compared to US$3.52 in China. 
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formal actors and institutions could play out in the larger context. To this end, I 
describe the role that bazaars have played historically as an important place for 
disruptive improvisation, and how the bazaars have always experimented with 
electronic products. Through empirical examples, I analyse the everyday 
improvisation that makes the bazaar an important player in the domestic market 
of electronics in India. I further depict the type of consumers that are dependent 
on the bazaars for their purchases of cheap electronics. In the final section, I show 
how, historically, the bazaar-like mode of transactions and the accompanying 
survival instinct has been part of the manufacturing process in India, and how the 
hasty and one-dimensional approach that MiI seems to be undertaking, is 
foolhardy when it comes to dealing with the informal economy. A large part of the 
population became involved in state-led modernising programs by semi-legal 
routes. In order for MiI to truly reach the bulk of the people, first there needs to be 
an understanding of bazaar level conditions and then a willingness to make real 
changes in the MiI agenda to involve people who do not have elite privileges. 
Electronic bazaars and improvising2 
Traditionally, the bazaars have played a crucial role in the domestic market for 
electronics. They are places for selling products, and for tinkering with them, 
creating new kinds of cheap and accessible products. The bazaars are part of a 
transnational network of ‘globalization from below’, where semi-legal goods and 
crisscrossing trade networks have made electronics accessible to growing sections 
of the urban underclass, whether in original (often recycled) or in counterfeit 
versions. Gordon Mathews and his colleagues contrast this to the  
high-end globalization, governed by the multinational corporations whose names 
everyone knows, from Apple to Nokia to McDonald’s to Coca Cola to Samsung, and 
by institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. It is globalization as 
championed by nation-states, as well as by mainstream media outlets as The Wall 
Street Journal and The Economist. It operates, at least in theory, in a legal and 
transparent way. ‘Lower-end globalization’ on the other hand, operates under the 
radar of the law. It may involve obtaining knock-off goods, whose logos have been 
appropriated from the brands of ‘high-end globalization’, and smuggling those 
goods across borders for sale by street vendors in cities across the globe. (Mathews 
and Yang, 2012: 97-98) 
While speaking about Delhi’s bazaars, Lajpat Rai market, Palika Bazaar and Nehru 
Place, Ravi Sundaram (2010) sees them as part of a ‘Pirate Kingdom’, which 
describes the other side of India’s postcolonial existence. Sundaram maps out 																																																								
2  The terms ‘improvising’ and ‘tinkering’ are used interchangeably to contrast bazaar 
level technological fixes with the top down ‘innovation’ models that are more respectful 
of intellectual property laws as well as institutional training and research. 
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Delhi’s Masterplan of 1962 that privileges the vision for the future from the elites’ 
perspective (politicians, technocrats and the burgeoning section of bureaucrats). 
The modernist plan laid the grounds for the zoning of the city into residential, 
commercial and industrial zones. 
The displacement of ‘noxious’ trade and ‘non-confirming industries’ outside the 
city, along with private dairies and gwalas, which were to be removed to designated 
areas. Slums were to be subject to clearance and renewal based on a survey and 
classification of slum areas. (Sundaram, 2010: 46)3 
As the process of ordering the city along the lines of the Delhi’s Masterplan began, 
the bazaar became one of the few places where a less disciplined life existed and 
flourished. In the Mughal era and in colonial times, bazaars were open places, a 
meeting ground for merchants and tradesmen from villages and towns (Bayly, 
1998; Fanselow, 1990; Yang, 1998). Sundaram (2010) argues that Delhi’s Lajpat 
Rai market, Palika Bazaar and Nehru Place are an extension of the ‘secret’ life of 
the bazaars of the eighteenth and nineteenth century – a diverse range of 
commodities sold face-to-face via messy networks of people, products and power 
alliances. 
Lajpat Rai market, Palika Bazaar and Nehru Place were built in the early decades 
of the country’s independence to largely rehabilitate Sikh and Hindu partition 
refugees. Lajpat Rai market in the old Delhi area, overlooking the Historic Red 
Fort was developed in the 1960s as a wholesale electronics market. Over the years, 
the market has sold a host of products: transistors, switchboards, wires, TVs, music 
cassettes, bulbs, and video games to name a few. Palika Bazaar located in the 
central district of Delhi was the first underground air-conditioned market in Delhi. 
Established in the 1970s, it came to host a number of traders from the 
neighbouring areas. The dome-shaped building with a number of concentric 
circles is a retail market selling clothes, electronics, food, toys, and books, among 
other things. In the 1970s, town planner Jagmohan imagined Nehru Place as a 
kind of European ‘piazza’ where cultural and intellectual life would mix with 
commerce. By the 1990s, Nehru Place had become one of the important markets 
in Asia, selling computer hardware, assembled computers, and pirated 
software/video games. The market also has a number of corporate offices, 
computer showrooms and repair centres. 
Sundaram (2010) and Liang (2010) described the urban bazaars as vibrant places 
that throw light on ordinary lives and their politics. The chaotic physical landscape 																																																								
3 ‘Gwalas’ means ‘herdsmen’ in Hindi. The urbanization schemes made them marginal 
and many of them gave up their traditional trade in favour of pursuits more suitable 
for an urban context. 
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and commercial exchanges paved the way for the presence of media goods in forms 
unanticipated by their original creators. In his analysis of counterfeited brands in 
Tamil Nadu, Constantin Nakassis (2013) used the words ‘surfeits’ to include the 
grey domain in which products circulate outside of authorised consumption. 
Nakassis places the discourses and practices of ‘surfeits’ in the world of fake 
brands and copies that has opened up a whole world of negotiation for the non-
elites to legitimise global brands.  
Apart from providing access to consumer products, Sundaram (2010) observes 
that the labyrinth like bazaars provide protection to people who have been displaced 
by the urban plans, such as groups of migrants, slum dwellers and labourers. 
Sundaram shows how the dense and crowded shops in Palika Bazaar help traders 
to evade police raids by retreating to the interior parts of their shops. 
Pointing out the relation that bazaar-like places develop with commerce and 
legality, Liang (2010) uses Partha Chatterjee’s distinction between a civic and 
political society to show how the non-elites’ relation to state laws and policies is 
different to how ‘citizens’ perceive it. As he puts it: 
In India, for instance, the creation of the category of the citizen subject demanded 
a move away from the oversignified body of the individual marked by religion, 
gender, caste, and so on to an unmarked subject position, ‘the citizen’, a category 
based on equality and access and guaranteed rights within the constitutional 
framework. But the majority of the people in India are only precarious who often do 
not have the ability to claim rights in the same manner as the Indian elites do. 
Instead, the manner in which they access the institutions of democracy and ‘welfare’ 
is often through complex negotiations and networks and often is marketed by their 
illegal status. (Liang, 2010: 360) 
Gulshan Kumar, a fruit seller in the Daryaganj market established the T-Series 
Music and Film production company by recording popular Hindi film songs with 
lesser-known artists. Taking advantage of the ‘fair use’ clause of the Indian 
copyright Act, Kumar was able to circulate his cassettes to every nook and cranny 
of the country. His story represents how ordinary people use loopholes in the legal 
systems and form lucrative alliances to get past their own limitations of wealth, or 
education (Liang 2005). 
In Liang and Sundaram’s work, ‘piracy’ is synonymous with the bazaar way of life. 
The different practices of ‘counterfeiting, copying, smuggling, and trafficking’ 
create sources of livelihood for people who could not take part in the modernising 
project in India through official channels (Dent, 2012: 29). With its decrepit 
infrastructure and open networks of traders, distributors and importers, Delhi’s 
bazaars create new media forms testing the legal and aesthetic limits of urban 
existence. 
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Improvising, from a fieldworker’s point of view 
In this section, I use empirical examples to describe how the traders tinker with 
the hardware of video games. Street level tinkering is significantly different from 
the systematic way in which innovation is imagined in formal spaces such as 
corporations and public institutions. While many of these innovations anticipate 
profits through patents, it is the lack of a proprietary regime that gives the bazaars 
the opportunity for tinkering. Needless to say, these disparate approaches to 
intellectual property laws come from completely different motives. While for 
formal actors, they communicate with an existing market, in most cases for the 
informal actors the pressure is to constantly create a market for ‘small profits’, 
which suit the needs of low level consumers. 
I first visited Delhi’s bazaars towards the end of 2012 and conducted a year-long 
ethnographic study that lasted from September 2012 to September 2013. I spent 
time interacting with the traders. I had structured interviews with them and casual 
conversations on a day-to-day basis. At times, I also interviewed consumers and 
distributors who came to the shops. I went back to the markets in January 2015 
and later in the months of March and April 2016. I focused mainly on the traders 
of video games, seen by some scholars as an information product per excellence 
(Dyer-Witheford and Sharman, 2005; Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2009). I was 
interested in finding out what happens when a sophisticated video game enters 
the culture of backyard innovation in the bazaars.  
In Lajpat Rai market, I spoke to close to 18 traders of video games. Most of the 
shops were small, having enough space to accommodate a trader and his assistant. 
A few of the shops were more spacious with organized displays on the walls. While 
makeshift shops kept appearing and disappearing at regular intervals, by the time 
I was well into my fieldwork, I had established good contacts with five shops that 
I regularly visited, at least once a week. With other shops, my visits were contingent 
on the trader’s willingness to talk to me on a given day. During the time that I 
spent in Lajpat Rai, I saw the shops not just as places for selling products, but also 
as places where a single product could be broken down into different parts based 
on the needs of the market. A shop would have a ‘Made in China’ handheld video 
game, but also circuit boards, parts of which were sold loosely or used for 
repairing. There would be cartridges, original and pirated DVDs, knock-off and 
original consoles. On top of that were the abandoned consoles, parts of which were 
used for repair. The possibility of a product to be a finished good and a raw material 
at the same time created the spirit of tinkering. As long as the assemblage or 
dismantling of a product created new consumer bases, it was worth exploring in 
the markets. To quote from field notes: 
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Harish is a distributor who comes every other day to Lajpat Rai. He acquires TV 
games from local manufacturers and sells them to the traders at a wholesale rate. 
The local manufacturers import component parts such as circuit boards from China 
and package the final product in India. In this way they are able to save custom 
duties and can also provide a novelty to the product (by way of packaging and 
attractive covers). In July 2013, I was at Bharat’s shop when Harish approached him 
with new TV games. While dealing with locally assembled consoles, they started 
talking about the skills that bazaar actors have. Both were in agreement; putting 
together different parts produced in China needed one to have basic knowledge 
about electronics. However, the skill and knowledge of Chinese workers were much 
higher than Indians. Their analysis attributed the gap in Indian workers’ knowledge 
to a lack of opportunity and resources. Bazaar actors do not get to work on 
sophisticated machines, unlike their Chinese counterparts. They also pointed out 
that any innovation, even grey ones, received appreciation from the Chinese 
government. In contrast, the Indian government did not support bazaar level 
solutions. 
In Palika Bazaar, I interviewed 20 traders and shop assistants. Many of these 
traders were from small business families in Delhi. A few traders were also 
migrants in the city. Coming from the surrounding states of Delhi, these traders 
had started their businesses by chance. Ramesh, a trader, recollected how in the 
late 1990s, he was a delivery person with the popular gaming franchise Milestone. 
On his many visits to the markets, he realised the possibility of having his own 
shop there. After negotiating with an existing trader in one of the shops, he was 
able to acquire a small corner. From there he started selling original and 
contraband video games. Most of the shop assistants were migrants in the city. 
They travelled from neighbouring states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar looking 
for job opportunities in Delhi. Many of them had similar stories of how they had 
found a job in the market by simply wondering around and interacting with the 
existing traders. 
The shops at Palika have original DVDs and consoles, second-hand and pirated 
DVDs, refurbished consoles and gaming accessories. The second-hand economy 
of games attracted a range of consumers to the market. With an ingenious trader 
buying a used DVD from a consumer, it opened up the market for used games. 
Simply by packing old DVDs with transparent paper and putting price tags on the 
back (to give the impression of a new DVD), many traders found ways to 
resuscitate their trade, foraying into areas the formal economy did not take into 
account. The repairing and modding of gaming consoles are among the activities 
that create a niche market. 
Lalit is a repairperson of video games in Palika Bazaar. In early January 2015, he 
bought an expensive ‘reballing’ machine from China costing him about ₹200,000. 
He has been making a living out of cracking PlayStation and Xbox consoles since 
the 1990s. He knew how to fix new hardware to the motherboard, enabling old 
consoles to play new DVDs of video games. However, he has found it to be a good 
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strategy to invest in ‘reballing’ machines. He believes that there is going to be more 
work in the line of repairing IC boards of gaming consoles. According to him, 
companies such as Sony and Microsoft are unable to create sound integrated circuit 
boards, as they have to cram a number of functions into a tiny chip. The result is 
that some of the solder balls get damaged. With the reballing machine, he is able to 
fix the damaged solder balls. Lalit points out that it is a very delicate operation. He 
took a week’s training from a person in Bombay to understand all the nitty-gritty of 
reballing. Lalit recollects that it was very difficult to find someone working in this 
particular area. He says, even after finding the right person, it took much persuasion 
to convince the person to train him. He paid ₹30,000 for just a week’s training. Lalit 
thinks that it was a worthwhile investment. He points out that the New Sony 
PlayStation 4 is about ₹50,000. It is beyond the capacity of the average person in 
India to afford such an expensive machine. Gamers are more likely to repair their 
old consoles than to invest in new ones. This creates the space for someone like Lalit 
to use his reballing skills and revive damaged IC boards. He is willing to spend 
hours meticulously heating the chip to remove it from the motherboard. Then 
carefully remove the old solder and replace it with new solder balls. For Lalit the test 
is both physical as well as mental. A successful reballing procedure takes him close 
to six hours and requires ₹1200 worth of electricity. Lalit thinks considering 
everything else, it is turning out to be a lucrative investment. He gets approximately 
₹2500 for each reballing job. 
In Nehru Place, I interviewed approximately 50 street vendors of pirated software 
and games. About 90% of them came from the Madanpur Khadar Resettlement 
colony4. Many of them grew up close to the market, and the market was like an 
after-school playground. Seeing friends and acquaintances selling software and 
games, the young men started as street vendors from a young age. They kept in 
their stock pirated DVDs/CDs of computer games and other kinds of pirated 
software. The DVDs/CDs were illegally downloaded in the Chandni Chowk area 
in old Delhi. On most days, a delivery person arrived in the early hours with the 
pre-ordered stock and distributed them to the different groups of street vendors. 
The market picked up in the 1990s, and along with it, the trade of pirated software 
and computer games. What was at that time seen as a luxury product, a single 
DVD of Adobe, sold for close to ₹5000, but the pirated versions of them were 
available for ₹500. The street vendors sold only pirated computer games and none 
of the console games. A reason quoted for this was that their consumers did not 
have enough money to buy a console. Most of them did not even own a personal 
computer. The consumers that the street vendors encountered were likely to buy 
an assembled computer and they bought gaming DVDs/CDs as an additional 
purchase. The traders mentioned the consumers’ first interest was to download 
																																																								
4  The Delhi Development Authority relocated the residents from slums in Nehru Place, 
Nizamuddin, Sarojini Nagar, Hauz Khas, Chanakyapuri, and Kalkaji to the Madanpur 
Khadar Resettlement colony (Batra and Mehra, 2008). 
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the pirated version of Microsoft word. If the gaming DVDs piqued their interest, 
they also bought them.  
The place of the bazaars in today’s consumer society 
The last section analysed empirical examples of everyday improvisation in the 
bazaar. This section develops how everyday improvisation connects video games 
to the mass consumer in India. I describe the place of the bazaars in the 
contemporary consumer society in India, taking into account the new middle class 
as a harbinger of a new kind of consumerist aspiration. 
The rise of a consumer society in India has received attention. The early 1990s 
were the watershed years, when the country embarked on an era of economic 
liberalization. Since then scholars have noticed marked changes in consumer 
behaviour. Leela Fernandes (2006), for instance, argues that in the decades 
following the country’s independence, frugality was a dominant trait of 
consumers. However, she argues that the attitude changed dramatically following 
the1990s:  
In the 60s and 70s this whole bit of accumulation of wealth was still suffering from 
a Gandhian hangover. Even though there were a whole lot of families who were 
wealthy all over India in the north and south, if you notice, all their lifestyles were 
very low key. They were not exhibitionists or they were into the whole consumer 
culture. Now I see that changed completely… You want to spend on your lifestyle. 
You want your cell phone. You want your second holiday home, and earlier, as I 
said, people would feel a sense of guilt – that in a nation like this, a kind of vulgar 
exhibition of wealth is contradictory to Indian values. I think now consumerism has 
become an Indian value. (Fernandes, 2006: 29) 
The changes in consumer habits are tied to the celebration of the middle class. 
Even within the amorphous middle class, it is the urban English educated 
professionals, the so-called ‘new middle class’ that has been the harbinger of the 
consumer economy in India. Seen by some as the poster children of India’s 
neoliberal ambition, this class of upwardly mobile professionals spends 
substantially on clothes, gadgets and cars, placing them on a par with a global 
consumer class (Butalia, 2013). 
Although the middle class and the new middle class have directed the consumer 
economy, the number of people who purchase consumer goods is difficult to 
measure. One of the problems is the gap between people’s perception of belonging 
to middle class and their actual income level (Bhattacharya and Unnikrishnan, 
2016). Studies have noted that a large number of people think that they belong to 
the middle class, although their income level is much lower to that of the median 
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group. The 2011-12 India Human Development Survey (IHDS) jointly conducted 
by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) and the 
University of Maryland suggests that the Indian middle class composes 6% of the 
total population. An annual income of 2.7-13.4 lakh was taken as the benchmark. 
The same survey found out that about 49% of the population perceived themselves 
as belonging to the middle class, although their monthly income was close to 
₹5000, much lower than the average income of ₹22,000 (Kundu and Rathore, 
2016). A Pew Research Centre Study puts the global middle class estimation at 
$10-20 per capita daily income and defines a lower income group as earning 
between $2-10 dollars daily. According to these estimates, only 2% of the 
population in Indian fall into the middle class category. Most people are in the low-
income category: they rank much closer to the lower limit of $2 dollars rather than 
$10 (Venkataramakrishnan, 2015).  
If we take into account consumer behaviour per se, the IHDS study shows that 
90% of the time, people had only one of the following consumer durables: a motor 
vehicle, a computer or laptop, a TV set, a cooler or an air conditioner, and a 
refrigerator. In most cases, people owned a TV set and not the others. Moreover, a 
household having all of the five assets belonged to the top 2.75% of the entire 
population (Kundu and Rathore, 2016). These studies highlight that the rich and 
the new middle class constitute only a small part of the entire population (Anand 
and Thampi, 2016). Most people are in the low-income group or poor, surviving 
with a daily income of $2 or less.  
The bazaars remain places that cater primarily to people who have consumer 
desires but might not have the resources to translate them into reality. Many 
people who came to the markets in 2013 were from low-income group and the 
diverse middle class. In Palika Bazaar, a category of consumers was urban 
professionals, people working in the corporate sector as either technological or 
managerial professionals. Another popular category was school students who 
came accompanied by their parents and guardians. A third category was buyers 
who made home deliveries of games to individual customers. Finally, there were 
gamers from lower and middle-income groups that came to repair consoles.  
Being primarily a wholesale market, the main type of buyer in Lajpat Rai market 
was the distributor who made deliveries to shops in the urban periphery, or to 
other cities, small towns and villages in India. The individual consumers who came 
to the market were mostly parents who wanted to give their children affordable 
handheld games. The consumers coming to the Nehru Place were mostly young 
men who bought pirated computer games. Much like the street vendors, the 
consumers were immersed in the informal economy. Some of them worked as 
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delivery boys or as shop assistants in parts of Delhi and in the national capital 
region. 
I encountered many young gamers in Nehru Place who were unemployed or were 
in odd jobs. They liked to play combat games such as Mustapha on their cell 
phones. The gamers downloaded pirated versions of different games on their 
phones and approached their friend networks to acquire cheap DVDs. The markets 
were attractive to people who could have the experience of playing games like 
Counter-Strike on the assembled PCs they had bought in the market. Many of them 
came to know of games by playing them in popular gaming cafés.  
This section described the role of the bazaars in the contemporary consumer 
economy particularly with respect to the outreach of the bazaar to mid- and low-
level income consumers. The next section analyses how bazaar practices have 
historically resulted in a particular model of capitalism. Within this model, 
manufacturing did not develop into a full-blown industry, but was characterised 
by small ventures. The small and medium level enterprises were an outcome of 
capital being diverted from industrial investments to speculative practices in the 
bazaars. 
Bazaars’ role in India’s manufacturing journey  
This section describes the relationship between the growth of a native 
manufacturing base and bazaar practices. Particularly in the nineteenth century, 
bazaar level transactions began to form an important part of capitalist organization 
and thus determined the shape that manufacturing and industrialization would 
take in independent India. Historically, India’s manufacturing base was made up 
of artisanal and craft units. In order to integrate the dispersed production units 
into the market, there were informal arrangements. Tyabji (2015) argues that the 
lack of plantation-like arrangement made it difficult for the colonial powers to 
transform traditional household units into a large-scale industrial base. An 
exception to this was tea plantation. The spatial location of labour in tea gardens 
made it relatively easy to build industrial units, similar to the way industrialization 
began in England. However, with most other businesses including those of cotton 
and jute it was difficult to attain the same level of organization. As Tyabji (2015) 
suggests, this led to the development of intermediaries and practices of speculation 
that prevented the growth of an industrial culture.  
Even after independence, major industrialists diverted capital from industries to 
speculative practices. Profits were not kept aside for further investments but were 
used to speculate in the bazaars, based on the rise and fall of global prices and local 
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production. It was the physical bazaars, where credit operators worked that were 
the centers of commerce. In an economy characterized by high credit risks at the 
base, the bazaars represented a set of financial methods, which effectively exploited 
the poverty of population and the uncertain seasonal agricultural conditions 
(Tyabji, 2015: 9). 
In India, we have seen a move from merchant to speculative capital without full-
fledged development of industrial capital (Arrighi, 1994). The bazaars, combining 
the ethos of semi-legal transactions and a physical market place had an important 
role in the growth of a unique culture of manufacturing.  
The intermixing of institutional and traditional practices in the manufacturing 
scene continues to this day. The ASSOCHAM and E&Y (2016) report points out 
that small-scale units dominate the manufacturing scene in India. Most of the 
time, they do not have the necessary resources and networks to complete 
production in a single industrial unit (Raj and Sen, 2016). This results in small-
scale firms subcontracting parts of the production process to the informal 
economy (Moreno-Monroy et al., 2014). 
The closest that the MiI has come to considering the informal economy is by 
foraying into the start-up economy. In fact, the ASSOCHAM and E&Y (2016:20) 
report identifies start-ups as possible partners ‘to bring out the real spirit of the 
“Make in India” initiative’. In order to ‘mix local production and assembly of parts’, 
the report states the ‘focus needs to be on indigenous product conceptualizing to 
manufacturing’. Start-ups are considered as agents that are able to build lucrative 
enterprises amenable to the prevailing environment.  
However, starts-ups have a completely different ecosystem from the bazaar and 
the only way they can incorporate the informal economy is by transforming its 
participants into a new kind of ‘platform labour’ (Srnicek, 2017). Start-ups have a 
more systematic approach to intellectual property laws and innovation in general 
and their ethics do not necessarily fit into the flexible improvising that bazaars are 
known for. Aggregators, such as Ola and Uber, have an institutional culture that 
uses algorithms to manage their business models and at the same time have a 
traditional hiring process in which people are recruited by word of mouth 
(Sakthivel and Joddar, 2006; Padmanabhan, 2016). 
Conclusion 
Bazaar actors are now caught in an environment where the only real form of 
collaboration they see is through meeting the labour requirements of the 
burgeoning start-up economy (Chakravarty, 2015; Crabtree, 2016; Lerche, 2015; 
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Sethi, 2015). Otherwise they find themselves marginalized, as there is an urgency 
for the government to formalize the informal economy. The spread of bank 
accounts, the Aadhaar scheme, as well as the demonetization of 2016 are attempts 
at tracking black transactions and formalizing credit exchanges (Ghosh, 2016; Rai, 
2016)5. Moreover, e-commerce businesses are targeting the same market for cheap 
and second-hand goods, previously provided by the bazaars. It appears that if an 
ambitious program like MiI does not see bazaar level economic practices as more 
than a regressive grey economy, the infrastructure and knowledge of popular 
consumers might be lost. 
However, the loss is not one-sided. Outside of the corrupt networks, bazaars 
embody an industrious way of life that is unique to India. The difficulty in building 
a homogenous manufacturing base cannot be blamed only on self-interested 
corrupt industrialists. The fact that India is a country with many small and 
medium level enterprises shows that the problem is much wider than corruption 
alone.  
If we talk of Wittfogel’s (1957) thesis of oriental despotism, building on Karl Marx’s 
notion of an Asiatic mode of production, then we need to take seriously the 
hypothesis that unequal distribution of power was an integral part of productive 
activities in the sub-continent. The centralized power that rulers held through 
control over the canals that circulated water paved the way for large governable 
communities. Moreover, colonial power did not establish its domain in an 
egalitarian society. One of the reasons that colonial power succeeded was that it 
fuelled the rivalries of princely states and later built a land tenure system that 
empowered the landlords to collect taxes. Compared to the elites, the masses face 
many constraints, not only economic, but cultural and religious as well, mainly 
through the caste system and communal tensions. Things like professional 
training, knowledge of the English language, access to capital and intellectual 
property protection benefit mostly the elite knowledge workers. 
If it were not for the bazaar-like places, different knowledge systems, and obsolete 
products, the spirit to turn constraints into opportunities would not exist. This is 
where MiI falters: it is unable to understand its own population and their everyday 
struggles. It is constructing a completely new infrastructure of factories and shop 
floors. Probably a more fulfilling exercise would be to continue conversations on 
both sides: create new infrastructure and alliances with formal actors as well as 
reach out to informal actors, include their popular knowledge and creative spirit. 																																																								
5  Aadhaar is a 12-digit unique-identity number that is tied to an Indian citizen based on 
his or her biometric and demographic data. This scheme has been criticized on privacy 
grounds as it permits greater control over individual movements.  
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The bazaars have always included more people and products, most of which are 
otherwise rejected as excess as in the case of the urban poor or obsolete goods. 
Most importantly, bazaars have an ecosystem, which allows the gainful 
employment of a large number of people with a heterogeneous set of technical 
skills and limitations.  
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